City Of Chicago V. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., Us, 134 N.E.2D 296, 8 Ill. 2D 341 – .Com

See also MacGillivary v. Dana Bartlett Ins. The court held:"And where the policy or the contract of life insurance contains the right of the insured to change the beneficiary, such right must be exercised in the manner provided in such policy or contract. In the case of Equitable Life v. Brown, 213 U. See also, 44, Insurance § 1785 (1969); 46 C. J. S. Insurance § 1176 (1946); 25 A. L. Cook v. equitable life assurance society for the prevention of cruelty. R. 2d 999 (1952) and Later Case Service (1981); 2A J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 1078 (1966). Agency, 14 52, 59-61, 436 N. 2d 964 (1982). Nor was the fact that it did not stand to gain. They lay no foundation for the jurisdiction of a court of equity in such a case, unless it appears that the relation between the policy holder and the defendant is that the latter is the trustee of the former by reason of the trust relation between them resulting from the insurance policy.

1. Cook v. equitable life assurance society for the prevention
2. The equitable life assurance company
3. Cook v. equitable life assurance society for the prevention of cruelty
4. Scottish equitable life assurance policy

Cook V. Equitable Life Assurance Society For The Prevention

Theoretically, "[a] professional partnership, whose reputation depends upon the individual skill of the members, has no good-will to be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution. " However Cook failed to notify the insurance holder that he wanted to change the beneficiary of his policy. 366, 371, 170 N. 2d 350 (1960). 305, 308, 190 N. 603 (1934) (interest of designated beneficiary of life insurance policy described as "a qualified vested interest, which is subject to be divested and defeated should the assured in his lifetime exercise the power given him to change a beneficiary in the manner prescribed by the contract between the insurer and the assured"); see also National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. In short, the Will is not a will as such, but simply a "means for supplying... proof" as to the trust's particulars. 1029, 111 S. W. 3d 12, 16-17 (1937). ¶ 24 Our review of the jury charge reveals the following instructions: If you do so find in favor of Mr. Cooke and against the defendants, you must also determine for the purposes of damages whether the defendants acted intentionally, recklessly or negligently. Co., 13 N. 31; Cohen v. Mutual Life Ins. Scottish equitable life assurance policy. Illinois Supreme Court. 52 ("The fact that the insurance trust relies upon the settlor's will is not in itself sufficient to make the trust testamentary in character. The result should logically be the same. From these facts, a reasonable fact-finder could determine that Mackey acted rashly and negligently in reacting to Cooke's draft brought to his attention. In or about February 1974, FM extended group insurance coverage to Manfred under a pair of policies issued by the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States (Equitable): Group Life Policy No.

The Equitable Life Assurance Company

So the basic rule is that if. The "willful or knowing" precondition is "directed against callous and intentional violations of the law.... " Heller v. Silverbranch Const. Cook v. equitable life assurance society for the prevention. 29 Am., Jur., Insurance, § 1309, p. 977. As the trial court noted, Federal Judge Charles Smith testified: "I was shocked that anybody would accuse Mr. Cooke of misrepresentation. Rectifying this omission requires a mere arithmetical computation, not a new trial.

Cook V. Equitable Life Assurance Society For The Prevention Of Cruelty

The court may rely upon it to declare a trust, just as courts have justifiably relied on informal papers, e. g., Barrell, supra, intrafamilial correspondence, e. g., Stratton, supra, and jottings on an envelope, e. g., Herman, supra, to establish trusts. To this day, Equitable has never been able to identify such a claim. Douglas was allowed to change the insurance beneficiary by writing to Equitable and having them endorse the change. Any such finding would be based upon a failure to comprehend the fact that the court had granted a nonsuit as to the termination issue. We note that the admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. 3(9)(f) in that it "[f]ail[ed] to effectuate prompt... settlement[] of [a] claim[] in which liability ha[d] become reasonably clear. At 93; it was "sufficiently identified" in the text of the designations, Bemis, 251 Mass. Having rejected each and all of appellant's arguments, we bring this segment of our rescript to a close. They hold only that federal courts should dismiss interpleader actions when federal adjudication would disrupt ongoing state proceedings--a concept with which we can readily agree. Nevertheless, Doris asserts that Indiana adheres to the majority rule finding an attempt to change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy by will, without more, to be ineffectual. Moreover, Sandra's right to the 30% share of the accidental death benefit had never been questioned or challenged.

Scottish Equitable Life Assurance Policy

Soc., 145 F. 2d 945, 949 (3d Cir. Jackman, 145 F. 2d at 949. 29, 36, 139 N. 329, trans. Co., 50 N. 610; People v. Security Life Ins. " Tyler v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 226 Mass. Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. To give effect to such intent they feel is a logical extension of Modern Brotherhood and would not abrogate existing Indiana law. It is elementary that a mere intention on the part of the owner to put properties to a common use is not sufficient to allow a cross petition in a condemnation action, but such properties must be considered as they existed at the time the proceedings were commenced, (White v. ;, ) and whether or not the cross petition is proper is a question of law which must be decided by the court. The record does not indicate that any meaningful amount of legal work was independently required because of the presence of the 30% accidental death benefit share in the case. Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE HERSHEY, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in a reversal based on undue restriction of proof of value, but I also believe the trial court erred in refusing evidence in support of the cross petition. 178, 186-88, 146 N. 277 (1925) (when wife left property upon terms "as shall be provided for the trust established by my said husband's will relating to the residue of his estate, " wife's will established a valid " 'referential' trust... separate and distinct from the trust fund created by her husband"); Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society, 130 Mass. In Holland the court also recognized that the beneficiary had a right in the executed contract which was subject to defeat only by a change of beneficiary which had been *115 executed in accord with the terms of the insurance contract: "In that contract Anna Laura, the beneficiary, had such an interest as that she had, and has, the right to insist that in order to cut her out, the change of beneficiary should be made in the manner provided in the contract. " Mayes & Longstreet, for appellant. As previously noted, plaintiff met his burden of proving damages by presenting evidence that he had been unable to schedule meetings with past customers after Mackey sent his letter.

They were not used for any common purpose as one tract of land. Code (which was not in effect when. 179; Wingo v. First National Bank of Pontotoc, 60 So. Next, the understanding by the recipient as intended to be applied to the plaintiff.

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